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The Challenge of Community-Based Armed
Groups: Towards a Conceptualization of Militias,
Gangs, and Vigilantes
MORITZ SCHUBERTH
Abstract: The proliferation of irregular armed actors which defy simplistic definition has
caught public and academic attention alike, not least in the pages of this journal. To move
the debate on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) forward, this article seeks to enhance our con-
ceptual understanding of parochial armed groups which are not primarily driven by ideological
or religious objectives. Thus, this article clarifies similarities as well as differences between
subtypes of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) on the one hand, and between
CBAGs and other NSAGs, on the other hand. By doing so, a typology is developed that clas-
sifies militias, gangs and vigilantes on the basis of their political, economic and security-related
dimensions. The resulting ideal types are discussed through the lenses of different explanatory
frameworks and policy debates in the field of contemporary security studies. A major typolo-
gical issue is the tendency for CBAGs to ‘turn bad’ and become threats to the stability they
were expected to transform, becoming a serious problem in countries where they operate. It
is concluded that the challenge of CBAGs ultimately needs to be addressed by putting in
place a functioning state that can tackle the underlying woes that led to their proliferation in
the first place.
Introduction
A decade ago, an urgently needed debate about the changing nature of warfare and
the role of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) emerged on the pages of Contemporary
Security Policy. The 2005 symposium on Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) dis-
cussed how political, economic, social and technical change brought about new
forms of war, in which the state’s monopoly on the use of force has increasingly
been eroded.1 The most important challenge posed by 4GW is the proliferation of
‘non-state actors who increasingly seem to control initiative over the use of violence,
its intensity and duration’.2 Moreover, 4GW is characterized by what Krause termed
‘hybrid violence’, which makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between com-
batants and civilians, between criminal and political motives, and between conflict,
post-conflict, and non-conflict armed violence.3 In this respect, a 2009 special
issue of Contemporary Security Policy shifted the debate on NSAGs beyond politi-
cally motivated insurgents and terrorists towards groups with more parochial objec-
tives, such as militias, gangs and vigilantes. This theme has equally been explored in
a subsequent article by Podder, who offered a useful distinction between community-
based and capital-based armed groups.4
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The relevance and urgency of better understanding such groups has been substan-
tiated over the last couple of years by the explosion of NSAGs in all parts of the
world—be they pro-Russian separatists engaging the Armed Forces of Ukraine in
eastern parts of the country, anti-balaka vigilantes combating Se´le´ka rebels
in Central African Republic, self-defence forces fighting against drug cartels in
Mexico, Boko Haram wreaking havoc on civilians in northern Nigeria and neighbour-
ing countries, or private armed groups and terrorists operating on the southern Philip-
pine island of Mindanao. While all these examples claim to be fighting for a political
project or the common good of their community, they have been found to be primar-
ily motivated by narrow interests.
Yet, despite abundant contemporary examples of such parochial armed groups
driven by rent-seeking behaviour and increasing academic interest in these groups,
they have not yet been thoroughly conceptualized. This is mainly due to the fact
that the vast majority of attention—both scholarly and otherwise—has been given
to ideologically motivated rebels during much of the 20th century, and subsequently
to religiously motivated terrorists, since militant Islamism replaced the Cold War-era
spectre of communism as the most urgent threat to international security on 11
September. What is more, there is a lack of understanding the transformation such
groups tend to undergo in the course of their existence. Thus, the aim of this
article is to bring forward the debate by proposing a typological conceptualization
of community-based armed groups (CBAGs)—an underexplored subtype of
NSAGs—as well as their transformed counterparts.
Differentiating CBAGs from NSAGs and discerning different types of CBAGs
entails important implications for policy-makers. While politically motivated
rebels might be turned into functioning political parties adhering to democratic prin-
ciples, this is not an option for parochial CBAGs without any tangible political aims
whatsoever, apart from self-enrichment and financially contingent support for their
political sponsor. At the same time, unrestricted use of force—as to some extent
employed in the War on Terror—can have adverse effects when utilized against
CBAGs, as indiscriminate violence risks further alienating marginalized commu-
nities from the state. Ultimately, more so than in the case of other NSAGs, the
only viable solution to the problem posed by CBAGs lies in building democratic,
accountable, and equally developed states bound by and enforcing the rule of law.
Yet, this is a notoriously lengthy and complicated process, notably in countries
plagued by one or another type of CBAGs.
Community-Based Armed Groups and Non-State Armed Groups
Literature on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) often appears over-inclusive, at the
expense of analytical clarity. For instance, one particularly wide-ranging categoriz-
ation includes no less than eight types of armed non-state actors: (1) Rebels and guer-
rillas; (2) militias and paramilitaries; (3) clan chiefs and big men; (4) warlords; (5)
terrorists; (6) criminals, mafia and gangs; (7) mercenaries, private military companies
(PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs); (8) marauders and ‘sobels’.5 More
commonly used is a five-fold typology of NSAGs that differentiates roughly
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between criminals, warlords, terrorists, insurgents, and mercenaries.6 Studies using
such a broad typology include cases as varied as the Islamist militant group Hezbollah
in Lebanon, the Japanese Mafia, the transnational criminal gang Mara Salvatrucha,
the Irish Republican Army and the South African PMC Executive Outcomes.7 To
avoid analytical inconsistencies stemming from too broad categorizations, this
study focuses on community-based armed groups (CBAGs), which are conceptual-
ized as a subtype of the broader category of NSAGs. Two criteria for exclusion
and one criterion for inclusion have been identified to differentiate between
CBAGs and NSAGs.
First of all, making a distinction between formal and informal armed groups
appears more appropriate than the habitual state/non-state divide. This is because
CBAGs are regularly sponsored or even created by state actors, but usually not for-
mally established or regulated by law.8 Therefore, the category of CBAGs excludes
formal NSAGs such as PSCs and PMCs, which have only recently been included in
typologies of NSAGs. A decade ago, Mair as well as Shultz et al. identified four ideal
types of NSAGs—warlords/militias, rebels/insurgents, terrorists, and organized
criminals.9 While this basic differentiation is roughly mirrored in more recent
studies, mercenaries are now regularly added as a fifth category to account for the
surge in PSCs and PMCs.10 In a few cases, however, the boundary between formal
security companies and informal armed groups is blurred. In Nairobi’s Kibera
slum, for example, a former police officer told me that he employs members of
local vigilante groups in his PSC on behalf of small businesses as a way to
monitor their conduct and to prevent extortion.11 Another borderline case is Haiti,
where industrialists hire CBAGs to provide security for factories which are located
within or in close proximity to gang-controlled areas.12
Secondly, the category of CBAGs excludes politically motivated NSAGs like
insurgents and terrorists. Such groups are above all else ideologically or religiously
driven, strive to disrupt public order to further their political cause, and aspire to
take over the state in order to establish another political system. CBAGs, by contrast,
do not primarily pursue a political mission. If CBAGs are pulled into the political
sphere, they act on behalf of political entrepreneurs who might also happen to be
leaders of such groups. In these cases, political aims are parochial in nature and
limited to the ambitions of local strongmen in their community. Concerning national
politics, CBAGs are if anything hired as armed wing of political parties, thus advan-
cing their economic interests rather than a political platform. That being said, CBAGs
have to be differentiated from peaceful and unarmed grassroots movements with a
genuine political agenda, often referred to as community-based organizations or
civil society organizations. Drawing this distinction is often a difficult endeavour
because social movements whose demands cannot be channelled peacefully into
the political system may decide to take up arms.13 Moreover, CBAGs can masquer-
ade as non-governmental organizations in order to position themselves as de facto
liaison between their communities and international agencies, as I witnessed in
Haiti.14 In addition, two qualifications have to be made regarding the exclusion of
politically motivated rebels and terrorist groups.
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To begin with, a number of scholars have incorporated equivalents of CBAGs in
their typology of rebel groups, even though admitting that these subtypes do not
strictly qualify as rebels. By way of example, in his seminal study, African Guerrillas,
Clapham distinguished between liberation insurgencies, separatist insurgencies,
reform insurgencies, and warlord insurgencies.15 This categorization has been
broadly adopted by Reno, who adds ‘pariochial rebels’ as a fifth category of rebels
in Africa.16 However, warlords and ‘parochial rebels’ are hardly comparable to
other types of insurgents who seek to overthrow the state in order to radically alter
its territory or political system. Quite the contrary, ‘the emergence of warlord and
parochial rebels overwhelms and undermines the efforts of ideologues [and] their
vision of armed rebellion’.17 In contrast to anti-colonial rebels who fought for inde-
pendence, separatist insurgencies who fought for secession, or reform rebels who
fought for revolutionary change, warlords seek ‘a change of leadership which does
not entail the creation of a state any different from that which it seeks to overthrow’.18
Parochial rebels, in turn, fight ‘to protect themselves from the corruption of the state
and the predators around them, instead of capturing the states like their warlord
counterparts’.19 Indeed, Reno’s concept of parochial rebels, ‘who fight to protect cir-
cumscribed communities [and] face obligations to heed the interests of their commu-
nity backers’, is the closest equivalent to CBAGs in the literature on NSAGs.20
The second qualification regarding the exclusion of terrorists and insurgencies
concerns the use of the label ‘terrorist’.21 With the shift from the Cold War to the
War on Terror, the main focus of attention in the literature on NSAGs switched
from rebel groups to terrorist groups.22 Especially in the aftermath of 9/11, the
term ‘terrorism’ has been used almost exclusively to describe acts of terror committed
by religious fundamentalists, more particularly militant Islamist groups.23 Such reli-
gious extremist groups, which are the primary object of investigation in the contem-
porary field of terrorism studies, are excluded from the category of CBAGs. However,
it has to be stressed that ‘[t]errorism is above all a tool or, if you will, a technique
[that] is as old as warfare itself’.24 From this perspective, armed groups are not auto-
matically excluded from the category of CBAGs just because they engage in terror-
istic acts, which are defined as politically motivated, clandestine attacks on civilians
in order to instil fear in a larger target audience.25 In fact, such acts are routinely com-
mitted by a number of armed groups that are not usually categorized as terrorists, such
as militias in the African Great Lakes region or criminal gangs in Central America.26
The most important criterion for including NSAGs into the category of CBAGs is
their eponymous embeddedness within the community in which they emerge. The
boundaries of the community can be defined (1) by territory—such as an urban neigh-
bourhood or a village; (2) by blood ties—as in a family or clan; or (3) by a shared
identity—like in the case of ethnic groups. Whatever the nature of their community,
its demarcation limits the reach of CBAGs. This means that CBAGs do not seek to
take over the state, even though they may be instrumentalized or hired by national
political actors in order to defend or topple a regime. Hence, the community that
serves as referent object for CBAGs is by definition incongruent with the nation
state. Rather, the community is a localized subunit of the nation; in some cases, it
transcends state boundaries. This is in contrast to Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined
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The relevance and urgency of better understanding such groups has been substan-
tiated over the last couple of years by the explosion of NSAGs in all parts of the
world—be they pro-Russian separatists engaging the Armed Forces of Ukraine in
eastern parts of the country, anti-balaka vigilantes combating Se´le´ka rebels
in Central African Republic, self-defence forces fighting against drug cartels in
Mexico, Boko Haram wreaking havoc on civilians in northern Nigeria and neighbour-
ing countries, or private armed groups and terrorists operating on the southern Philip-
pine island of Mindanao. While all these examples claim to be fighting for a political
project or the common good of their community, they have been found to be primar-
ily motivated by narrow interests.
Yet, despite abundant contemporary examples of such parochial armed groups
driven by rent-seeking behaviour and increasing academic interest in these groups,
they have not yet been thoroughly conceptualized. This is mainly due to the fact
that the vast majority of attention—both scholarly and otherwise—has been given
to ideologically motivated rebels during much of the 20th century, and subsequently
to religiously motivated terrorists, since militant Islamism replaced the Cold War-era
spectre of communism as the most urgent threat to international security on 11
September. What is more, there is a lack of understanding the transformation such
groups tend to undergo in the course of their existence. Thus, the aim of this
article is to bring forward the debate by proposing a typological conceptualization
of community-based armed groups (CBAGs)—an underexplored subtype of
NSAGs—as well as their transformed counterparts.
Differentiating CBAGs from NSAGs and discerning different types of CBAGs
entails important implications for policy-makers. While politically motivated
rebels might be turned into functioning political parties adhering to democratic prin-
ciples, this is not an option for parochial CBAGs without any tangible political aims
whatsoever, apart from self-enrichment and financially contingent support for their
political sponsor. At the same time, unrestricted use of force—as to some extent
employed in the War on Terror—can have adverse effects when utilized against
CBAGs, as indiscriminate violence risks further alienating marginalized commu-
nities from the state. Ultimately, more so than in the case of other NSAGs, the
only viable solution to the problem posed by CBAGs lies in building democratic,
accountable, and equally developed states bound by and enforcing the rule of law.
Yet, this is a notoriously lengthy and complicated process, notably in countries
plagued by one or another type of CBAGs.
Community-Based Armed Groups and Non-State Armed Groups
Literature on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) often appears over-inclusive, at the
expense of analytical clarity. For instance, one particularly wide-ranging categoriz-
ation includes no less than eight types of armed non-state actors: (1) Rebels and guer-
rillas; (2) militias and paramilitaries; (3) clan chiefs and big men; (4) warlords; (5)
terrorists; (6) criminals, mafia and gangs; (7) mercenaries, private military companies
(PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs); (8) marauders and ‘sobels’.5 More
commonly used is a five-fold typology of NSAGs that differentiates roughly
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a militia, or as a gang. First of all, when the security dimension is most pronounced, a
CBAG belongs to the category of vigilante groups, which is subdivided into crime-
control groups, self-defence forces, and—in the transformed form—para-states.
Second, when the political dimension of a CBAG is most prominent, it may be classi-
fied as an ethnic or popular militia, or—in its transformed type—as a form of warlord-
ism. Third and lastly, CBAGs whose economic dimension stands out can be
categorized as a criminal gang, a youth gang, or—in its transformed type—as a crim-
inal fiefdom.
In other words, each dimension corresponds with a different ideal type of CBAGs;
and each ideal type includes two subtypes and one transformed type. Moreover, each
ideal type is typically analysed through different explanatory frames and highlighted
in different policy debates. Vigilantes are most commonly analysed through the fra-
mework of state failure and underlined in debates on ungoverned spaces. Militias, by
contrast, are mostly discussed as part of the debates about new wars and new barbar-
ism; and tend to be investigated through the lens of patronage and clientelism. Lastly,
gangs are sought to be explained by notions of criminality and delinquency, and
feature prominently in greed-versus-grievance debates. It is important to note that
the nomenclature of ideal types as well as the corresponding explanatory frames
and policy debates are employed in a highly stylized manner, meaning that the
real-life examples presented in this article are by necessity much messier than any
heuristically informed typology could account for.
For over time, one ideal type might not only evolve into a transformed type, but
can also turn into another ideal type as soon as a different dimension becomes domi-
nant. Moreover, most CBAGs fulfil criteria of multiple ideal types simultaneously.
Thus, classifying an armed group can provide only a momentary snapshot of
which dimension constitutes currently the predominant feature. This is due to the
fact that the concept of CBAGs is inherently blurry, fluid, and dynamic. Ogada
and Mue confirm with reference to CBAGs in Kenya that ‘[v]igilantes can turn
into gangs and gangs can turn into armed militia’.32 Thus, as with virtually all typol-
ogies, in reality, the distinction between the ideal types is blurred and hardly any
CBAG can be permanently allocated to one category exclusively. In this respect,
Weber wrote that ideal types are:
. . . formed by a one-sided accentuation of one or several perspectives, and
through the synthesis of a variety of diffuse, discrete, individual phenomena,
present sometimes more, sometimes less, sometimes not at all; subsumed by
such one-sided, emphatic viewpoints so that they form a uniform construction
in thought. In its conceptual purity this construction can never be found in
reality, it is a utopia.33
Vigilantes
The first ideal type of community-based armed groups refers to groups that are
engaged in different types of vigilantism. Vigilante groups are defined either as
‘citizens who organize themselves into groups to take the law into their own hands
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TABLE 2
EXPLANATORY FRAMES FOR IDEAL TYPES OF CBAGS.
Dimension Security Political Economic
Ideal type Vigilantes Militias Gangs
Framework State fragility/failure Patronage/clientelism Criminality/delinquency
Policy debate Ungoverned spaces New wars/barbarism Greed versus grievance
Subtypes Anti-crime groups Self-defence groups Ethnic militia Popular militia Youth gang Criminal gang
Examples of subtypes Bakassi Boys, Nigeria Self-defence Forces, Mexico Mungiki, Kenya Colectivos, Venezuela Pandillas, Nicaragua Maras, Honduras
Transf. type Para-state Warlord state Criminal fiefdom
Examples AUC, Colombia Taylorland, Liberia Comando Vermelho, Rio
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in order to reprimand criminals’,34 or as ‘associations in which citizens have joined
together for self-protection under conditions of disorder’.35 Consequently, the
purpose of vigilantism can be subdivided in ‘crime control and/or social control’
directed at members of the own community,36 and in measures to defend the commu-
nity against external threats.37 Ideal-typical vigilantes can be distinguished frommili-
tias and gangs, in that their primary function is providing security, rather than
pursuing their political or economic interests. In reality, however, vigilantes have a
tendency to transform into militias and gangs;38 or, as Rodgers has it, to ‘turn
bad’.39 In its transformed version, vigilantes can turn into ‘para-states’—paramili-
taries who establish their own fiefdom in which they ‘operate as the functional
equivalents of states’.40
Classical examples of crime-control groups include People Against Gangsterism
and Drugs in South Africa’s Cape Flats, the Bakassi Boys in south-eastern Nigeria,
and a plethora of small vigilante groups in the slums of big cities in Kenya.41 In
Mexico, by contrast, farmers and former soldiers formed typical self-defence
groups to take back cities and regions under the control of drug cartels, whereas
similar groups called ‘arrow boys’ have formed in South Sudan in order to protect
their villages against Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army.42 Concerning the trans-
formed type of vigilantes, Colombian paramilitary groups such as the Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia and an affiliate called Bloque Cacique Nutibara transformed
from defensive vigilantes into offensive ‘para-states’ with political ambitions. In con-
trast to the ideal-typical crime-control and self-defence vigilantes, they pose a direct
challenge to national security as they commit acts of ‘violence that [are] deliberately
intended to destabilize the state itself’.43
State Fragility
The Kenyan and South Sudanese cases provides textbook examples of the emergence
of vigilantism in the context of state fragility, whereas the formation of self-defence
forces in Mexico and of paramilitaries in Colombia shows that vigilantism can also be
found in relatively strong and viable modern states.44 Nevertheless, vigilantes tend to
be associated with state fragility, as vigilantism is commonly attributed to a ‘state’s
apparent inability to deal effectively with [ . . . ] theft and other crime’.45 From this
point of view, ‘vigilantism is likely to occur when the state is unable or unwilling
to fulfil its part of the social contract’.46 The failure or collapse of the ‘Westphalian
system of Weberian states’ since the end of the Cold War has resulted in the state’s
loss over the ‘monopoly on the legitimate means of violence’.47 In this respect,
numerous studies have shown how non-state armed groups take over state security
functions in fragile states48 and how international interventions attempt to restore
the state’s monopoly over the use of violence.49
However, a growing number of scholars criticize the very concept of state fragi-
lity as conceptually flawed, historically ill-informed and culturally biased towards the
ideal type of liberal Western democracies.50 Despite this criticism, scholarship on
state fragility has greatly influenced policies towards states deemed ‘failed’ or
‘fragile’. Top diplomats stressed ‘the importance of dealing with the problem of
failed and failing states’51 because they were seen as posing ‘one of the most
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important foreign policy challenges of the contemporary era’.52 Particularly in the
wake of 9/11, security circles became increasingly concerned with the perceived
risks posed by ‘ungoverned spaces’,53 within which ‘[t]errorism finds sanctuary’,
in the words of—then future and now former—US Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel.54 More recently, the concept of fragility has been applied to urban areas,
resulting in an emerging body of literature on so-called ‘fragile’ or ‘feral’ cities.55
For some analysts, fragile cities—which ‘can exist in weak or strong states’—are
‘the new frontier of “ungoverned” spaces’ and pose an even greater security chal-
lenge than failed states.56
Alternatively Governed Spaces
Yet, regardless whether ostensibly ‘ungoverned’ spaces are located in rural or urban
environments, it has been shown that they are in fact under control of ‘alternative
authority and governance structures’.57 Thus, it is more accurate to talk about
‘areas of limited statehood’58 and ‘under- (or alternatively) governed spaces’.59 In
this respect, it has been argued that the loss of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate
use of violence does not lead to ‘polypolies of violence’ that would be characterized
by anarchy and a Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’.60 Rather, this loss leads to ‘oli-
gopolies of violence’ which are made up of ‘a fluctuating number of partly compet-
ing, partly co-operating actors of violence of different quality’.61 Since state fragility
is associated with a rise in criminal violence, citizens are said to ‘naturally turn to
warlords and other strong figures who [are] offering the possibility of security at a
time when all else, and the state itself, is crumbling’.62
However, not all citizens are equally affected by the state’s inability to provide
security.63 Those living in the most affluent parts of the main cities often enjoy func-
tioning protection by police and private security firms, while those living in neglected
areas are denied access to formal security systems.64 This ‘duality of rich and poor’ is
reinforced by rapid urbanization, which triggers primarily the growth of informal
settlements.65 It has even been argued that the withdrawal of the state in selected
localities is a deliberate political choice, amounting to ‘state abandonment’ rather
than state failure.66 On top of that, many governments accept informal security pro-
viders as a ‘cheap form of law enforcement’ for the poorer sections of society.67 This
is most evident in cases where informal ‘violence specialists’ are employed by state
actors to carry out the ‘dirty work’ in undergoverned areas.68 All in all, residents in
fragile states and so-called ‘ungoverned spaces’ are caught between the violence of
corrupt and repressive state security forces, on the one hand, and ‘parallel power
systems’ imposed by community-based armed groups, on the other hand.69
Militias
According to Weber, ‘the legitimacy of an order may be guaranteed or upheld in two
principal ways’, which operate complementary rather than exclusionary: First,
through ulterior self-interest; second, through ‘purely disinterested motives’.70
When applied to community-based armed groups (CBAGs), the first way corresponds
to the profit orientation of militias who, as clients, are paid by their political patrons.
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The second way concerns the interest of the patron ‘to establish and to cultivate the
belief in its “legitimacy”’.71 The belief in the legitimacy of an authority may be based
upon tradition, upon affectual attitudes, upon its legality, or upon the ‘rational belief
in its absolute values’.72 In countries where the private sphere is de facto separated
from the public sphere, the last two elements, united as legal-rational authority,
relate to regular armed forces: soldiers ideally do not only work for salary, but
strongly believe in the absolute value and legality of their state’s formal military
structure. CBAGs, by contrast, obey their patrons when the latter base their claims
to legitimacy either on traditional grounds—in the case of neopatrimonialism—or
on charismatic grounds—in the case of populism.73
When embarking on a neopatrimonial strategy, patrons evoke notions of ethnicity
or clan-based identity in order to legitimize their authority vis-a`-vis their clients,
including ethnic militias.74 The term neopatrimonialism derives from Weber’s
concept of patrimonialism, which relates to his traditional type of domination.75
What is new about neopatrimonialism is the combination of a patrimonial logic
found in traditional societies and a legal-rational, bureaucratic logic found in
modern states.76 Me´dard makes clear, however, that rather than constituting an ‘ana-
chronical, historical survival’, the evocation of kinship or ethnicity can be ‘con-
sidered as an artificial by-product of clientelist strategies used by political leaders
to create a following’.77
A similar strategy can be observed in the case of populist patrons, who evoke the
image of a common enemy of the excluded masses in order to legitimize their auth-
ority vis-a`-vis their clients, including popular militias. While ethnicity is hardly a
fixed or ‘primordial’ element, it provides nevertheless for a considerably more
stable support base than that of populist leaders. In order to compensate for the
fluid and hardly institutionalized base of followers, populists claim legitimacy on
the basis of Weber’s charismatic authority.78 This strategy has proved particularly
successful in times of political crises and economic decay, during which large
parts of the population feel marginalized or excluded and are receptive to the prom-
ises of self-declared saviours.79 Thus, populism can be defined as ‘the top-down pol-
itical mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge elite
groups on behalf of an ill-defined pueblo, or “the people”’.80
Subtypes of Militias
Considering that the obedience of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) to their
patrons is based both on self-interest and on either traditional authority or charismatic
authority, I distinguish between two subtypes of militias: First, ethnic militias;
second, popular militias. While both subtypes are tied to their political patrons by
way of a self-interested clientelistic relationship, the legitimacy for this relationship
is based on populism in the case of popular militias, and on neopatrimonialism in the
case of ethnic militias. In both cases, the breakdown of the clientelist foundation of
the political system can lead to the rise of warlordism.81 In the framework of CBAGs,
warlords are defined as the transformed type of militias. Warlords assume de facto
control over territory, in which they establish state-like structures and dominate the
local population through popular or ethnic militias.82 In order to tie militias to
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themselves, warlords pay financial rewards and claim legitimacy on the basis of tra-
ditional or charismatic authority. In this regard, Marten underlines that a warlord’s
‘authority is based on charisma and patronage ties to their followers’, while Bøa˚s
and Jennings point out that neopatrimonialism can provide warlords with ideational
legitimacy.83
Archetypal ethnic militias can be found in the eastern provinces of the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, where Mai-Mai formed in order to defend their ‘auto-
chthonous’ communities from a ‘foreign’ invasion.84 Another typical case is the
South Sudanese ‘white army’ ( jiech mabor), which comprises village youths that
are loosely connected by ethnic ties to Riek Machar, the former Vice President
who currently leads the opposition forces in the civil war against President Salva
Kiir.85 Popular militias, by contrast, are represented by Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s
baz or chime`res in Haiti, as well as by Hugo Cha´vez’ colectivos or Cı´rculos Bolivar-
ianos in Venezuela.86 The paradigmatic example of a transformed type of militia can
be found in Liberia, where the National Patriotic Front of Liberia—led by the arche-
typical warlord Charles Taylor—controlled as much as 90 per cent of the territory,
consequently dubbed ‘Greater Liberia’ or ‘Taylorland’.87
How does our categorization in two subtypes and one transformed type relate to
existing scholarship on militias? There is a tendency in the literature to subsume
vigilante groups and militias into one and the same category. For instance, Ero
suggests that vigilante groups, civil defence forces and party militias drive the ‘mili-
tianisation of war and security in Africa’,88 whereas Raleigh includes local security
providers in her typology of militias—in addition to emergency militias and compe-
tition militias that are used for political purposes.89 However, this understanding of
militias as a non-state provider of security is based on what Francis termed ‘First
Generation’ conceptualization of militias.90 ‘Second Generation’ militias, by con-
trast, ‘could be categorised as state or government sponsored’.91 Contrary to vigilante
groups that mimic the state in its absence, the ‘relationship with the state is impera-
tive’ for militias.92
Furthermore, it is common to classify militias based on their type of relationship
to the current government.93 This becomes problematic, however, if only groups with
affiliation to the party in power are considered militias, while opposition-aligned
CBAGs are classified instead as ‘counterstate actors’.94 For instance, a database on
pro-government militias lists the ‘Chimeres [sic] AKA Popular Organisations’ in
Haiti as having dissolved on 1 March 2004.95 Yet, this categorization seems to
miss the point, considering that the groups have been most active after 2004 and
are up to this date a main concern for MINUSTAH and national politics.96 Moreover,
this classification does not take into consideration the fact that a number of these
groups have been, and still are, opportunistically fighting both on the side of the gov-
ernment and on the side of the opposition.97 Furthermore, in Congo-Brazzaville and
Jamaica, to give just two examples, the main political parties each have their own
youth wings which are firmly rooted in different marginalized neighbourhoods of
the capital, regardless of which party is currently holding the government.98
Therefore, it appears more useful to focus on the fact that a militia acts on behalf
of a political actor, disregarding of the fact whether the latter is currently in power.
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A more important factor is the nature of the relationship between militias and their
patrons. In this respect, building on a typology first brought forward by Hills,
Jackson differentiates between three types of militias on the basis of their respective
leaders: First of all, the economically motivated ‘freelance militias’ are led by a ‘gang
leader’ and constitute the ‘least disciplined, least trained’ subtype of militias.99 Sec-
ondly, the more political ‘clan militias’ are tied to a ‘chief’ or ‘traditional leader’ of
their own clan or ethnic group. Lastly, ‘personal militias’, which operate at the behest
of warlords, are seen as a ‘“higher” political organisation’ compared to the other two
subtypes. This categorization seems more compatible with the categorization we
developed within the framework of CBAGs.100
New Barbarism and New Wars
Warlords such as Charles Taylor were regularly portrayed as ‘mindless barbarians
bent on dragging the population that lived in the areas they controlled back to a
dark age of tribalism’.101 The ‘barbarism, savagery, and “senseless” acts of vio-
lence’102 associated with warlords have largely been linked to their mobilization of
the ‘lumpen proletariat’ made up of ‘alienated youth’ and ‘other low status individ-
uals’.103 In an article widely circulated in diplomatic and foreign policy circles,
Kaplan warned that ‘hordes [of] young men with restless, scanning eyes’ in West
Africa, who are floating ‘like loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid [ . . . ]
on the verge of igniting’, give ‘an eerie taste of what American cities might be like
in the future’.104 Civil wars, most notably those in Africa, have long been associated
with highest levels of cruelty and barbarity, especially when contrasted to seemingly
more ‘modern’ inter-state wars characterized by the use of sophisticated technology
and a clear distinction between combatants and civilians.105
The evocation of Malthusian fears of ‘disease, overpopulation, unprovoked
crime, [and] scarcity of resources’ is not limited to African civil wars, though. In
the face of media-savvy drug cartels combining extreme brutality with the ‘instru-
mental use of narcocultura’, Mexico analysts have posed the question: ‘To what
extent will this new barbarism and depravity go?’106 Likewise, Rapley interprets
the rise of ‘gang-controlled neighborhoods’ across Latin America and the Caribbean
as evidence of a ‘new medievalism’ in which the West should keep ‘barbarian tribes’
at bay in order to avoid the fate of decay experienced by the Roman Empire.107
However, Chabal and Daloz and Keen point out that underneath the extreme brutal-
ity, societal divisions are instrumentalized by rational political entrepreneurs.108 Con-
sequently, the authors reject the idea that ‘ancient’ ethnic or tribal hatreds
incomprehensibly or inevitably erupt in irrational and barbaric ‘acts of degrading bru-
tishness’.109 Likewise, Richards criticizes the new barbarism thesis as biologically
and environmentally deterministic as well as culturally essentialist.110 From his
point of view, terror tactics employed in Sierra Leone’s civil war have been ‘devil-
ishly well-calculated’, rather than being representative of an ‘essential African sava-
gery’ or an ‘irrationality of violence’.111
The strategic use of terror to sow fear and hatred as employed by West African
warlords or Mexican drug lords is a fundamental characteristics AQ2
¶
of so-called ‘new
wars’.112 In addition to this changed mode of warfare, ‘new wars’ can be
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distinguished from ‘old wars’ in terms of their goals, which ‘are about identity poli-
tics in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars’, and in terms
of their financial sustenance, which depends on a criminalized and globalized war
economy.113 A hugely influential concept, the new wars thesis has been criticized
on methodological and conceptual grounds.114 The concept has come under scrutiny
regarding its claims about the central role of globalization.115 Similar questions
concern to what degree today’s conflicts actually differ from earlier ones.116 Yet,
Kaldor responded to critics that despite obvious continuities from ‘old’ to ‘new’
wars, the main objective of the distinction is to show policy-makers the inexpediency
of treating new wars ‘as anarchy, barbarism, ancient rivalries, where the best policy
response is containment, i.e. protecting the borders of the West from this malady’.117
Thus, even though the supposed ‘new barbarism’ is commonly attributed to the emer-
gence of ‘new wars’, the most important advocate of the new wars concept clearly
distances herself from the new barbarism thesis.
Gangs
Perhaps the most central argument of the new wars thesis is that violent conflicts are
increasingly depoliticized and instead more and more driven by economic incen-
tives.118 The question whether economic or political motivation is more important
has been debated around the dichotomy of greed versus grievance as the driving
factor for joining and sustaining rebel groups. Arguably, the most influential work
in this field has been conducted by Paul Collier and fellow World Bank economists,
who argue that ‘[c]onflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities
than by grievance’.119 The emphasis on greed is such that rebellion is presented as ‘a
distinctive form of organized crime’, while grievance is downplayed as a ‘discourse’
brought forward to ‘justify their actions in terms of ethnic, religious, or class div-
isions’.120 While most work on economic incentives in civil wars emphasized the
role of lootable resources such as ‘conflict minerals’ in sustaining rebellions,121 the
greed model can equally be applied to explain the involvement of gangs in criminal
activities such as kidnapping and drug trafficking.122
Despite its considerable impact on policy-making, Collier’s greed thesis has been
criticized on theoretical, methodological as well as conceptual grounds. Theoreti-
cally, neoclassical rational choice theories of war and conflict have been rejected
as ‘reductionist, speculative, and misleading’.123 Most prominently, the expedience
of using statistical correlations from large-N quantitative studies to explain the motiv-
ations of individual fighters has been questioned.124 Furthermore, a number of
methodological concerns have been raised, for instance, relating to sample size and
coding issues.125 Finally, Cramer objects to the dualistic conceptualization of
greed and grievance as opposing poles, despite evidence that they are ‘inextricably
linked’.126
Dialectically bringing together both greed- and grievance-accentuating theories,
numerous authors qualified the impact of economic factors, stressing that social, pol-
itical and security dynamics are equally important to explain violent conflicts.127 In
this respect, Ballentine and Sherman argue that ‘conceptualizing explanations of
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armed conflict in terms of greed or grievance has imposed an unnecessarily limiting
dichotomy on what is, in reality, a highly diverse, complex set of incentive and oppor-
tunity structures that vary across time and location’.128 Thus, a multi-causal explana-
tory framework is best suited to analyse complex phenomena such as community-
based armed groups (CBAGs), which have a political, economic and security dimen-
sion. Applying Clausewitzian terms to our typology of CBAGs, one could say that
militias are used for the continuation of politics by other means, vigilantes carry
out the continuation of security by other means, and gangs engage in the ‘continu-
ation of economics by other means’.129
Subtypes of Gangs
Many gangs around the world fulfil a political dimension and have historically been
used ‘as the pliant tools of corrupt, powerful city players of machine politics’.130 In
the conceptual framework of community-based armed groups (CBAGs), however,
the political dimension is already contained in the ideal-typical militia, while the
criminal dimension of CBAGs corresponds with the ideal type of gangs. This is in
line with conventional criminological research, according to which ‘involvement in
illegal activity’ is an essential part of the definition of gangs.131 For analytical pur-
poses, we distinguish between two subtypes of gangs, which are characterized by dif-
fering forms of criminal behaviour. The first subtype is youth gangs, which are
conventionally associated with a subculture of juvenile delinquency rather than
with for-profit organized criminality. The members of youth gangs are expected to
grow out of deviant behaviour when reaching maturity.132 The second subtype are
the more organized and institutionalized criminal gangs, which include members
of various age cohorts and are, at least from the point of view of law enforcement,
committed to profit-generating criminal activities.133 Each subtype can be traced
back to one particular school of gang research—the ecological approach or the
rational choice approach.
To begin with, the ideal-typical youth gangs are characteristic of the ecological
approach, which emphasizes the impact of cultural and societal influences on juven-
iles. In this tradition, gangs are defined as ‘unsupervised peer groups who are socia-
lized by the streets rather than by conventional institutions’.134 In his seminal work,
The Gang, which is generally considered to be the first comprehensive study on the
subject, Thrasher positioned the source for criminal motivation on the societal
level.135 In the tradition of the human ecology approach of the Chicago School of
sociology, gangs were treated as an organism in the urban ecosystem, caused by
the social disorganization of their natural habitat. A comparable approach is taken
by a number of more recent studies, which trace the emergence of gangs back to a
troubled past which has disrupted the social environment. From this perspective,
escalating levels of urban violence throughout Latin America—particularly in post-
conflict and post-authoritarian countries—can be explained by a ‘culture of violence’,
‘shadows of violence’, the ‘banality of violence’, or the development of ‘societies of
fear’.136 According to this explanatory angle, masculinity has an important role to
play and gangs are partly the result of ‘gendered socialization processes’ in the
midst of violence, to which young men are exposed.137
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The second subtype, by contrast, is congruent with the rational choice approach
and highlights the profit-oriented dimension of gangs. From this point of view, indi-
viduals decide rationally to join criminal gangs for their own economic benefits.
A number of studies from the 1980s/1990s saw the causes of gang formation in econ-
omic conditions of the American ‘underclass’,138 which are characterized by ‘an
intense competition for, and conflict over, the scarce resources that exist’ in low-
income neighbourhoods.139 In a similar vein, Padilla argued that gang members
‘view the gang as the most rational response to their social and economic circum-
stances’.140 Confronted with bleak prospects for regular jobs in the formal
economy, ‘young men began turning to the gang in search of employment opportu-
nities’, mainly in the local drug trade.141 In his ethnography of a public housing
complex in Chicago, Venkatesh explicitly rejects pathologizing notions of a
‘ghetto-specific [ . . . ] culture of poverty’ and instead argues that gang members
aspire for upward social mobility, even though through insecure and precarious
‘underground economies’.142 In addition to the two subtypes outlined above, one
transformed type—criminal fiefdoms—can be identified.143
Rodgers and Muggah distinguish between two types of gangs in Central
America:144 First, the ‘more localized, homegrown’ pandillas are the most
common type of gangs in Nicaragua. They resemble our subtype of youth gangs,
which can also be found in Timor-Leste, South Africa, as well as Europe and
North America.145 The maras, by contrast, have ‘transnational roots’ and are the pre-
dominant type of gangs in the Northern Triangle.146 Maras are closer to our criminal
gangs and have been found to work as local ‘subcontractors’ for Los Zetas and other
Mexican drug trafficking organizations which are expanding their operations south-
ward into Central America.147 Furthermore, certain gangs in Brazil, such as Comando
Vermelho, have imposed a ‘simulacrum of governmental control’ onto the favelas,
which serve as an ideal hiding place for drugs and provide a pool of unemployed
young men for recruitment.148 Having thus established their own criminal fiefdom,
the ‘Red Command’ and the rival factions in which it has split up can hence be cate-
gorized as transformed types of gangs.
Gangs and National Security
Given the rise of powerful transformed types of gangs, a debate emerged around the
question whether gangs should be analysed within the conceptual framework of non-
state armed groups (NSAGs).149 At the heart of this debate lies the question whether
gangs do pose a direct threat to state sovereignty or not. A number of authors based at
American military academies argue that gangs do ultimately aim to take control of the
state through an ‘evolutionary coup d’ street [sic] process’, in which they ‘take
control of turf one street or neighborhood at a time’.150 From this point of view, ‘pol-
itical-agitator gangs’ wage a new type of asymmetrical warfare coined ‘urban insur-
gencies’ or ‘criminal insurgencies’.151 Following this logic, Jamaican gangs are
directly compared to the Lebanese Hezbollah, as ‘the ultimate objective of both
organizations is to compel radical political change to achieve some form of effective
political control’.152
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However, the claim that gangs intend to seize state power has been clearly
rejected on the ground that most gangs would prefer to hide from or cooperate
with state actors rather than to confront them.153 In cases where gangs do ‘turn to
anti-state violence’, they have been found to do so ‘not, as in civil war, in hopes of
conquering [ . . . ] territory or resources, but to influence state policy’.154 At the
same time, a small number of gangs that have obtained control over large-scale crim-
inal fiefdoms, such as Comando Vermelho in Rio de Janeiro, ‘can afford to engage in
prolonged campaigns of aggression against [ . . . ] state forces’.155 While this can lead
to conditions of violence and disorder akin to civil wars, the state’s sovereignty is
arguably not directly challenged. Yet, by establishing a ‘parallel state’156 within
their neighbourhood, gangs of this kind pose at least an indirect threat to the state
because they undermine the authority of the government and prevent the enforcement
of law and order.157
Such sophisticated criminal organizations, wielding considerable control over
their criminal fiefdom and threatening state stability, constitute the transformed
type of gangs. Because of their ability ‘to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations’, this type of gangs ‘could potentially be considered “armed groups” as
understood in the context of IHL’158—albeit the legal basis for this reasoning is con-
tested.159 Legal considerations aside, it has been suggested that even though such
gangs do not seek to overthrow the state, they can still be considered NSAGs
because the harsh state response and the scapegoating they induce resembles the
way insurgents are regularly dealt with.160
Conclusion
As the cases mentioned in this article have shown, transformed types of community-
based armed groups (CBAGs) resemble each other more than subtypes resemble
other subtypes. Even though most, if not all, CBAGs have a political, an economic,
and a security dimension, one dimension is typically more pronounced—hence the
differentiation in the ideal types of militias, gangs and vigilantes. The transformed
types, by contrast, resemble one another to a higher degree because each dimension
is strongly pronounced. The criminal fiefdom of the Comando Vermelho in Rio, the
para-state of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) in Colombia, and Taylor-
land in Liberia all come close to constituting ‘states-within-states’ or ‘quasi-states’,
with a more or less sophisticated security apparatus, tremendous revenues from
illegal activities, and a considerable amount of de facto political power.161 Yet, all
these rather extreme examples started as quite ordinary CBAGs. Comando Vermelho
was initially a prison gang, the AUC formed as a self-defence group, and Charles
Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia started as a political militia.
The tendency of CBAGs to turn bad is a central aspect of the concept that runs
like a thread through all above-mentioned cases. For instance, many CBAGs start
as crime-control vigilantes or self-defence forces and end up running protection
rackets or working as subcontractors for organized crime groups or political entrepre-
neurs. This is what happened with pandillas andmaras in Central America, with rural
defence forces in Mexico, and with vigilantes in Kenya and Nigeria. Other CBAGs
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begin as political grassroots movements but end up as criminal gangs or as hired
thugs of political parties, as withMungiki in Kenya or some of the colectivos in Vene-
zuela. Thus, in virtually every discussed case, in the end, the very civilians compris-
ing the community to which CBAGs pledge allegiance are the ones who suffer most.
Additionally, in some cases, the security and integrity of the state are threatened. This
is most notably the case when vigilantes, militias or gangs turn into transformed types
of CBAGs. As a result of their tendency to turn bad and because of the threat to stab-
ility they pose when they have transformed, CBAGs are a serious problem for the
countries in which they form and for international actors operating in these countries.
Therefore, having a clear conceptual understanding of such groups is of utmost
importance for international actors working in conflict zones, especially in countries
with ongoing peacekeeping operations. Once an armed group has been classified as
vigilante, militia or gang, policy choices must be informed by this analytical knowl-
edge, as simply applying standard tools used to deal with other non-state armed
groups (NSAGs), such as rebels or terrorist groups, might worsen instead of
solving the problem.
There are two typical strategies vis-a`-vis NSAGs that have also been applied to
CBAGs: (1) coercion based on the use of force, as in military pacification operations
or mano dura (firm hand) anti-gang policies in Latin America; (2) cooperation on the
basis of dialogue and consensus, for instance, in the form of gang truces in Central
America or power-sharing arrangements with ethnic militias in Africa. However,
each approach has serious limitations. The problem with the coercive approach is
that the use of force may actually increase the proliferation of NSAGs if the state out-
sources law enforcement to vigilantes, or if political actors establish their own mili-
tias to counter those of their opponents. At the same time, if communities are
indiscriminately targeted in operations against CBAGs, they might in fact be
driven to support CBAGs against the oppressive state. Likewise, engaging CBAGs
in dialogue grants them legitimacy and strengthens them, thereby accelerating their
transformation into transformed types and further weakening the position of the state.
Therefore, an alternative approach towards CBAGs is needed that is based on the
substitution of the functions CBAGs fulfil for their members, sponsors, or commu-
nity. In contrast to the coercive and cooperative strategies, the substitutive approach
aims to enhance the legitimacy of the state by effectively rendering CBAGs obsolete.
This can be achieved only by improving the performance of the state with regard to
the three dimensions of CBAGs—security, politics, and economics. Concerning
security, the state must regain its monopoly over the legitimate use of force and
employ it in accordance with the rule of law, lest the communities in which
CBAGs are based are further alienated from the state. International efforts in this
regard should focus on security sector reform, whereby particular attention should
be paid to community policing schemes. On the political front, the use of militias
by political actors must be thwarted through the promotion of the core principles
of democracy, including good governance and respect for the rule of law. As far as
the economic dimension is concerned, development activities should focus on the
generation of job opportunities for at-risk youth in order to improve their life
chances and to limit the attractiveness of joining gangs. Community-based armed
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violence reduction and prevention programmes can be particularly helpful in this
respect.
However, institution building is a long-term endeavour and notoriously difficult
to implement for external actors. Moreover, it might face strong resistance from spoi-
lers with vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Still, it presents the sole sus-
tainable solution to the problem of CBAGs. Only a viable and modern state which
provides for the basic needs of its citizens and is based on the principles of democ-
racy—including accountability and a functioning rule of law—can address the secur-
ity-related, political, and economic problems that led to the proliferation of CBAGs in
the first place. Thus, international actors should focus their energy on improving the
performance of institutions when assisting states that are facing the challenge of
CBAGs.
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